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Processing Presupposition: Verifying Sentences with ‘Only’ 
 
Christina Kim* 
 
1  Introduction 
 
1.1  Presuppositions and Sentence Verification 
 
This paper is about presuppositions and how the information they contain is 
used by comprehenders to understand what a sentence means in a given 
context. In particular, I am interested in how presuppositions differ from 
assertions in how their content is processed procedurally. But let us start 
with the more basic question of why presuppositions are special to begin 
with. Why might we even expect that presuppositions would behave any 
differently from assertions, scalar implicatures, etc. in a behavioral task? 
One answer to this is that presuppositions appear to have a special 
discourse status—they’re characteristically backgrounded information with 
respect to the main assertion of a sentence, which is foregrounded or ‘under 
discussion’. Say presuppositions are noncontroversial, to borrow Stalnaker’s 
language—to put it now in terms of ‘speaker presuppositions’, a 
presupposition is material conveyed by a sentence that the speaker feels she 
can safely assume is already part of the common ground (or if it’s not, is 
something that interlocutors won’t take issue with—t at is, it won’t be a 
problem to accommodate that information or otherwise treat it as if it had 
already been in the common ground) (Stalnaker 1978, 2002, Simons 2002). 
The current study looks at this aspect of presupposition  from the point of 
view of processing; specifically it looks at the procedures people use to 
evaluate the truth or falsity of a sentence in some context, and asks where 
presupposition verification fits into such procedures.1 
With respect to what people do procedurally when they understand a 
sentence with a presupposition, we can identify (at le st) the following two 
                                          
*Thanks to Daniel Büring, Philippe Schlenker, Christine Gunlogson, Martin 
Hackl, Jason Kandybowicz, and Colin Wilson for helpful discussions and comments, 
or for at least patiently listening to me talk about this material when it was in varying 
stages of unpreparedness. 
1There’s also the projection behavior of presuppositions—that is, how the 
presuppositions of a complex sentence are related to the presuppositions of its 
subparts; this paper doesn’t say anything about the projection problem, but cf. 
Chemla and Schlenker (2006), who start with different pairings of presupposition 
triggers and quantificational environments, and ask whether inferences predicted by 
various projection theories actually arise. 
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states of affairs. First, it might be that presuppositi ns must be verified as a 
precondition for evaluating the truth/falsity of a sentence—in other words, 
you can’t compute a truth value unless all presuppositions have been 
verified. This is a kind of direct implementation of a Heim-style update 
model, or any logical system that will output ‘#’ or truth-value gaps in case 
of presupposition failure. I’ll refer to this as the ‘Preconditions’ hypothesis. 
In contrast, according to an ‘Assertion-first’ hypothesis, the backgrounded 
status of presuppositions leads comprehenders to simply take it for granted 
that they are satisfied in the context, without bothering to verify it, instead 
giving priority to the main assertion. 
The current study looks at verification procedures to pull apart the 
predictions of these two hypotheses.2 Sentence-picture verification will give 
us data that bears on the issue of how presupposition  are (i) treated by 
comprehenders for the purpose of understanding the (truth-conditional) 
meaning of a sentence, and (ii) relatedly, how they differ from assertions in 
terms of representation in a mental discourse model. On the basis of three 
experiments, I’ll argue for the following view of presuppositions and how 
they are processed: presuppositions are treated as backgrounded information 
and therefore simply assumed to be satisfied in the evaluation context. This 
means that when nothing else in the preceding discour e or the evaluation 
context independently makes the content of presuppositions salient, 
comprehenders can initially miss violated presuppositions. On the other 
hand, things that affect discourse salience or otherwis  increase salience in 
the (visual) context will strongly influence how likely comprehenders are to 
notice cases of presupposition failure. While the results of Experiment 1 
somewhat misleadingly suggest that comprehenders use presupposition 
violations immediately to reject a sentence (implying that presuppositions 
are verified first), Experiments 2 and 3 reveal that such situations only arise 
in case the content of the presupposition is made extra salient in the 
discourse context—that is, there is no requirement that comprehenders verify 
                                          
2Note that most if not all semantic theories of presupposition make no claim 
about the actual strategies people use when they are producing and understanding 
sentences. Even in dynamic approaches (Heim’s context-change model; Kamp’s 
DRT, Veltman, Zeevat, Beaver update models), where there seems to be a claim 
about procedure—that is, there’s a sequence of steps executed in order for the context 
to finally be updated with the information in a sentence—these models stop short of 
claiming that such procedures are adopted by people as a comprehension strategy. To 
take a simple example, suppose that presuppositions are defined in the theory as 
definedness conditions on context updates (as in Hem); actual comprehenders might 
simply assume without verification that presuppositi ns are satisfied, simply because 
to do otherwise would yield infelicity and be totally unproductive/uninformative (cf. 
von Fintel 2006). 
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presuppositions before evaluating the main assertion of a sentence. In fact, it 
will turn out that in some cases, comprehenders simply take presuppositions 
for granted, and only very late realize that these unverified assumptions are 
incompatible with information in the context. 
 
1.2  Sentence-Picture Verification  
 
To ask these questions we’re going to have people evaluate the truth or 
falsity of sentences of different types, given an evaluation context (a 
picture). The basic idea behind this paradigm is that for each kind of 
sentence (really, each kind of determiner), we know what information the 
comprehender needs from the visual display in order to decide whether the 
sentence is true or false; from that, we can make some basic assumptions 
about how comprehenders will search a visual display for the relevant 
information. When visual search procedures differ with different sentence 
types, we assume that these different strategies will be reflected in different 
reaction times (RTs). We can then use subjects’ RT data to infer what 
verification procedure they are using for some sentence type. 
For instance, consider what it would take to verify or falsify the 
sentence in (1), given the picture in Fig. 1 as evaluation context. 
 
(1)  Every kid has an umbrella. 
 
You’d have to go through the set of individuals in the picture, checking for 
each one whether (s)he has an umbrella. Because the search is 
sequential/serial in nature, we expect sentences of this type (with universal 
quantification) to have relatively slow response times. Further, we expect a 
True/False asymmetry: False cases will be faster than True cases, since you 
can falsify the sentence and terminate the trial upon finding just one falsifier, 
while a picture that makes the sentence true will contain no falsifiers, and 
therefore require exhausting the entire search space without finding one. 
Now consider (2). The corresponding picture would be much like Fig. 1, 
except that one of the boys would have the name ‘Dave’ printed on his t-
shirt. 
 
(2)  Dave has an umbrella. 
 
The procedure for verifying or falsifying this sentce is very different from 
the ‘Every’ case: all you have to do is find the person named in the sentence, 
and check whether or not he has an umbrella. Responding to such a sentence 
will take just as long as it takes to find the relevant individual in the 
picture—that is, we expect fast RTs relative to the ‘Every’ conditions. In 
addition, no True/False asymmetry of the type described above is expected. 
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Against the two verification strategies just described, now consider 
sentence (3). For now, assume that (3) asserts (4a), and presupposes (4b). 
 
(3)  Only Dave has an umbrella. 
(4)  a. No one other than Dave has an umbrella. 
       b. Dave has an umbrella. 
 
The two hypotheses outlined above for how presupposition  are evaluated 
with respect to assertions make different predictions for ‘Only’ sentences. 
On the one hand, if presuppositions are like preconditi s for computing 
sentence meanings, then presupposition verification will be the first thing to 
happen, and conditions where the presupposition of ‘only’ is not satisfied 
(Dave doesn’t have an umbrella) will be rejected very quickly, much like the 
Name conditions. But if comprehenders take presuppositions for granted and 
don’t bother verifying them, they’ll start by evaluting the assertion (whether 
anyone other than Dave has an umbrella), and may only discover afterward 
that their assumptions are at odds with the visual context (Dave doesn’t have 
an umbrella). In this case responses would be expected to be slow, like the 
‘Every’ conditions (since the assertive component of an ‘only’ sentence is 
also a universal statement). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Picture for ‘Every kid has an umbrella’ (false) 
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2  Experiment 1: ‘Only’ and Proper Names 
 
Experiment 1 tests the three sentence types mentiond above 
(Every/Name/Only) in a sentence-picture verification task. Under the 
assumption that a universal statement (e.g. ‘Every’ and the assertive 
component of ‘Only’) requires serial search through the visual display, and 
should therefore take longer than statements about individuals (e.g. the 
‘Name’ condition and the presupposition component of ‘Only’), reactions 
times to the Only-Presupposition failure conditions should indicate whether 
presupposition verification happens before evaluation of the assertion (fast 
RTs), or after (slow RTs). 
 
2.1  Methods 
 
2.1.1  Materials/Design 
 
Sentence type (Every/Name/Only) was crossed with Truth value 
(True/False), with an additional Presupposition failure condition for ‘Only’, 
making a total of seven experimental conditions. Each item consisted of a 
sentence-picture pair; example sentences and picture descriptions are given 
in Table 1. 
 
  TRUE FALSE 
Every 
Every boy has a 
book 
8 boys, each with a 
book 
4 boys with books; 4 
with non-books 
Proper name 
Mark has a book 
Mark with book; 7 
boys with either 
books or non-books 
Mark with a non-book; 
7 boys with either books 
or non-books 
7 boys with non-
books; Mark with 
book 
4 boys with books; 3 
with non-books; Mark 
with book 
Sentence 
type 
Only 
Only Mark has a 
book Presupposition failure: 
7 boys with non-books; Mark with non-book 
Table 1: Example sentence-picture pairs for Experimnt 1 
 
Picture scenes always displayed eight individuals evenly spaced out on the 
screen, and were created by Photoshopping together images from verbal 
competence tests (Curtiss and Yamada 2004, Dunn and Du n 1997). 
CHRISTINA KIM 218 
Three fixed order lists were created (items were not presented randomly 
in order to avoid accidentally presenting adjacent items with overlapping 
lexical items and/or names). Each subject saw 8 items from each condition, 
making a total of 56 experimental items per session.   
 
2.1.2  Procedure 
 
26 native speakers of North American English (UCLA undergraduates) 
participated in the experiment. 
Stimuli were presented on a Macintosh computer running PsyScope 
(Cohen et al. 1993). Each trial proceeded as follows: first, a sentence 
appeared in the center of the computer screen. After reading the sentence, 
subjects pressed a button, which would bring up a picture. The subject’s task 
was to respond (by button press) ‘Yes’ if the sentence accurately described 
the picture, and ‘No’ if it did not. The dependent measure was the RT to the 
picture (i.e. the duration from the first button press to the second button 
press). Each session took approximately 15-20 minutes. 
 
 
 
2.2  Results 
 
There were main effects of both Sentence type (F1(2,19)=44.0, p<.0001; 
F2(2,39)=43.3, p<.0001) and Truth value (F1(1,19)=55.3, p<.0001; 
F2(1,39)=54.5, p<.0001), and a Sentence type-Truth value interaction 
(F1(2,19)=20.3, p<.0001; F2(2,39)=20.2, p<.0001)); Figure 2 shows mean 
reaction times by condition. 
 
Fig. 2: Experiment 1: Mean RT by condition 
(error bars are Standard Error) 
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As expected, True conditions took longer than False conditions for 
‘Every’ (t=3.6, p<.005)3, but not for ‘Name’ sentences (t=.5, p<1.0), 
suggesting that the RT measure is sensitive enough to pick up differences in 
verification procedures. Looking at the three ‘Only’ conditions, the Only-
True condition took longer than both Only-False (t=8.0, p<.0001) and Only-
Presupposition failure (t=8.8, p<.0001); Only-False did not differ from the 
Only-Presupposition failure condition (t=1.3, p<.6), or from the Name-True 
(t=2.3, p<.2) and Name-False (t=1.7, p<.4) conditions. In addition, subjects 
took much longer to respond to Only-True sentences than to Every-True 
sentences (t=5.4, p<.0001). 
 
2.3  Discussion 
 
The fact that the Presupposition failure condition s fast, like the Name 
conditions and unlike the Only-True condition, looks like support for the 
‘Preconditions’ hypothesis: people are fast to reject cases of presupposition 
failure because presupposition verification precedes v rifying the assertion 
(and since the presupposition is not satisfied in the picture, it is immediately 
rejected as being incompatible with the sentence). 
There are reasons to be skeptical of this interpretation, however. For one 
thing, there’s a very large RT difference between the Every-True and Only-
True conditions—note that these are both universal statements that turn out 
true. There are only two obvious potential sources of this difference: (1) the 
assertive component of ‘only’ contains an extra negation (‘for all x, it’s not 
the case that x has some property’) that isn’t present in the case of ‘every’, 
and (2) ‘only’ possibly has this extra step of presupposition verification. But 
if either or both of these differences is the source of the Every-True vs. 
Only-True difference, the following additional data are mysterious: first, if 
the extra negation in the ‘only’ sentences is adding to the response times, 
Only-False should also take longer than Only-Presupposition failure, which 
it doesn’t. Second, if the extra presupposition verification step were the 
source of the RT difference, Only-False should take longer than Every-False, 
which it doesn’t (t=1.7, p<.5). We’ll leave this as puzzle for now, but 
return to it in Experiment 3. 
There is a more basic problem with Experiment 1, which is that the 
‘Only’ conditions involved proper names: after seeing a sentence like ‘Only 
Dave has an umbrella’, suppose the reason subjects attended immediately to 
the individual labeled ‘Dave’ in the picture is tha that individual has just 
been named, likely bumping up the salience of both the name and the 
designated individual (note also that the visual presence of the label in the 
                                          
3P-values are adjusted throughout for multiple comparisons, where appropriate. 
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picture probably also contributes to its visual salience). If this is what is 
going on, the fact that presupposition failure is noticed immediately is 
simply an artifact of stimulus design—the proper name just happens to bring 
into attentional focus exactly that part of the picture that tells you that the 
presupposition is violated. To fix this confound, Experiment 2 uses definite 
descriptions instead of names, with the intention of making it harder to 
immediately identify the relevant set of individuals in the display. 
 
3  Experiment 2: ‘Only’ and Definite Descriptions 
 
3.1  Methods 
 
There were 8 experimental conditions, created by crossing Sentence type 
(Every/Def/Only#/OnlyS)4 and Truth value (True/False); examples of 
sentences-picture pairs are given in Table 2. The definite description 
condition replaces the proper name condition from Experiment 1, and the 
‘only’ sentences are split up into two conditions (one where the 
presupposition of ‘only’ is not satisfied, and one where it is); Experiment 2 is 
otherwise identical in format to Experiment 1. Pictures were adapted from 
the set used in Experiment 1. 
Subjects saw stimuli from one of four lists. There w re a total of 64 
experimental trials per session. 40 UCLA undergraduates participated in the 
experiment. 
 
  TRUE FALSE 
Every 
Every kid has a book 
8 boys/girls, 
each with a book 
8 boys/girls: 4 with 
books; 4 with non-
books 
Definite description 
The girls have books 
2 girls with 
books; 6 boys 
with either 
books or non-
2 girls with non-
books; 6 boys with 
either books or non-
books 
Sentence 
type 
Only—presupp not met 
Only the girls have 
books 
2 girls with non-
books; 6 boys 
with non-books 
2 girls with non-
books; 6 boys with 
either books or non-
books 
                                          
4Abbreviations for condition names: Def = Definite descriptions; Only# = 
Only/presupposition failure; OnlyS = Only/presuppositi n satisfied. 
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  TRUE FALSE 
Only—presupp satisfied 
Only the girls have 
books 
2 girls with 
books; 6 boys 
with non-books 
2 girls with books; 
6 boys with either 
books or non-books 
Table 2: Example sentence-picture pairs for Experimnt 2 
 
3.2  Results 
 
Mean reaction times are shown in Figure 3. As in Experiment 1, there were 
main effects of Sentence type (F1(1,32)=130.5, p<.0001; F2(1,37)=130.9, 
p<.0001) and Truth value (F1(3,32)=38.7, p<.0001; F2(3,37)=38.8, 
p<.0001), and an interaction of Sentence type and Truth value 
(F1(3,38)=13.3, p<.0001; F2(3,37)=13.2, p<.0001). 
 
 
 
Post-hoc comparisons show that True conditions tookl nger than False 
conditions for both sets of Only conditions; differences were only numerical 
for Every and Definites. Within the Only conditions, OnlyS replicated the 
Experiment 1 results: True sentences took longer than False sentences 
(t=10.1, p<.0001). Only# show something different—the True sentences are 
slow, relative to both OnlyS-False (t=7.5, p<.0001) and Only#-False (t=7.2, 
p<.0001). OnlyS-True and Only#-True did not differ from each other (t=1.5, 
p=.4). 
   
Fig. 3: Experiment 2: Mean RT by condition 
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3.3  Discussion 
 
Recall that the two verification steps that are possibly involved in verifying 
‘Only’ sentences are (1) verifying the assertion—a negative universal 
statement (e.g. No one other than the girls has an umbrella), and (2) 
verifying the presupposition—basically identical to the Definite description 
case (e.g. The girls have umbrellas). In this experiment, unlike in 
Experiment 1, the key condition (Only#-True, where th presupposition is 
violated but the assertion is true) was slow relative to both Only-False 
conditions. This suggests that the Experiment 1 result did indeed have to do 
with stimulus-specific factors, as suggested, and supports the ‘Assertion-
first’ hypothesis about processing presuppositions—there is no requirement 
that presuppositions be verified initially, and in the absence of external 
factors that bring the content of the presupposition into attentional focus, the 
main assertion is evaluated first. 
There are a number of ways to see this in the data. First, note that Def-
False < Only#-True (t=3.4, p<.005); since verifying the presupposition of 
‘only’ will amount to the task required for the Def-True condition, the 
difference in RT suggests this is not the first thing that happens in the 
presupposition failure condition. Secondly, both OnlyS-False (t=2.0, p<.2) 
and Only#-False (t=1.2, p=.4) take the same amount of time as Every-
False—assuming these are all universal statements tha  evaluate to False, it 
makes sense that these conditions should look similar, if in fact the universal 
component (i.e. the assertion) is being verified first. Finally, Def-True > 
OnlyS-False (t=8.5, p<.0001); if the first step were verifying the 
presupposition, you’d expect the reverse, since evaluating a true definite 
statement would be a substep of the procedure implicated for an ‘Only’ 
sentence where the presupposition is satisfied. 
Going back for a moment to Experiment 1, recall that t ere was a big 
asymmetry between the Every-True and Only-True conditi s; we see the 
same large RT difference between the analogous two conditions in 
Experiment 2 (OnlyS-True > Every-True), and in fact there are similarly big 
differences between Every-True and the other two True conditions as well 
(Def-True, Only#-True). The difference between the Definites and ‘Every’ is 
particularly striking, since both types of sentences essentially say of some 
plurality of individuals that each member has some property.  
Suppose the Def-True > Every-True difference actually has something 
to do with properties of the definite determiner (after all, definites carry 
presuppositions of uniqueness/maximality of their own; even if these were 
always satisfied in the current stimuli, they could be contributing to overall 
processing complexity). In this case we’d still be left with no good 
explanation for the other True cases. However, there is another dimension on 
which the ‘Every’ conditions differ from the rest: while domain restriction is 
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completely trivial for ‘Every’ (e.g. Every kid has a book, where every 
individual in the picture is a kid), the other sentence types require that you 
distinguish the set of boys from the set of girls in order to be able to do the 
task accurately (e.g. Only the girls have books, where the display has both 
boys and girls). This means that in all but the ‘Every’ conditions, subjects 
have to apply a verification algorithm that is non-u iform, and consequently 
more complex.5 Unlike the definite determiner explanation, this would give 
us an explanation for why ‘Every’ is faster than all the other conditions. The 
goal of Experiment 3 is to find evidence for one of these two hypotheses. 
 
4  Experiment 3: Domain Restriction, Expectations, and 
Verification Complexity 
 
In addition to the conditions from Experiment 2, Experiment 3 had an ‘Every 
boy/girl’ condition—sentences like ‘Every boy has a book’. If the difference 
between the Definites and ‘Every’ in Experiment 2 was due to the definite 
determiner, ‘Every boy’ should pattern with ‘Every kid’. On the other hand, 
if ‘Every’ was fast relative to the other conditions because only the latter 
required non-trivial domain restriction, ‘Every boy’ should have slow RTs 
like the Definite and ‘Only’ conditions, and unlike ‘Every kid’. 
 
4.1  Methods 
 
Examples of the 5 sentence types used in Experiment 3 are in Table 3. 
Pictures were identical to those used in Experiment 2 (notice that the same 
pictures can be used for the ‘Every boy’ and ‘The boys’ conditions). 
 
Sentence type  
Every kid Every kid has a book 
Every boy Every boy has a book 
Definite The boys have books 
Only# Only the boys have books 
OnlyS Only the boys have books 
Table 3: Sentence types and examples for Experiment 3 
Subjects saw stimuli from one of five lists. With 8 tokens per cell of the 
                                          
5Conceivably, given a sentence like ‘Only the girls have books’, apply an 
algorithm like ‘If boy(x), then ¬book(x)’. 
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experiment, there were a total of 80 experimental tri ls per session. 32 
UCLA undergraduates participated in the experiment. 
 
4.2  Results 
 
Mean reaction times for Experiment 3 are shown in Fgure 4. As in 
Experiment 2, there were main effects of Sentence typ  (F1(4,22)=34.5, 
p<.0001; F2(4,35)=34.5, p<.0001) and Truth value (F1(1,22)=290.0, 
p<.0001; F2(1,35)=290.4, p<.0001), and a Sentence type-Truth value 
interaction (F1(4,22)=8.2, p<.0001; F2(4,35)=8.6, p<.0001). 
 
True conditions took longer than False conditions across Sentence types 
(all adjusted p<.001); as in Experiment 2, the Only#-True condition was 
slow relative to both Only#-False (t=8.0, p<.0001) and OnlyS-False (t=6.1, 
p<.0001), and did not differ from OnlyS-True (t=1.7, p<.1). For the ‘Every 
boy’ conditions, True sentences pattern with Def-True sentences (t=1.2, 
p<.25), and took longer than ‘Every kid’ (t=10.2, p<.0001).   
 
Fig. 4: Experiment 3: Mean RT by condition 
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4.3  Discussion 
 
Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiment 2, supporting the idea that 
presuppositions are not explicitly verified as a first step to interpreting a 
sentence given some context.  
The fact that ‘Every boy’ behaved like ‘The boys’ and unlike ‘Every 
kid’ suggests that the difference observed in Experim nt 2 between Definites 
and ‘Every’ was not due to properties of the definite determiner, but rather a 
difference in the complexity of the verification algorithm required. The 
current results show that the conditions that take  long time to respond to 
are the ones that require subjects to distinguish among sets of individuals in 
the display (boys vs. girls). In contrast, the ‘Every kid’ cases allowed 
subjects to take a shortcut: even though there is domain restriction in 
sentences like ‘Every kid has a book’, it is completely trivial since every 
individual in the display was a kid. Notice that it’s not as simple as the fact 
that ‘boys’ and ‘girls’ are both necessarily ‘kids’—if the types of individuals 
that could appear in the trials happened to include, for instance, dogs and 
cats, we would expect the ‘Every kid’/’Every boy’ asymmetry to disappear. 
The ‘shortcut’ effect we’re seeing, then, has to dowith subjects’ 
expectations about what they will see from trial to trial: thus, even though 
the pictures provided in the experiment are the evaluation contexts for 
sentences in individual trials, one might think of there being a kind of 
‘meta’-context which reflects the set of expectations a subject develops over 
the set of experimental trials about what is/isn’t possible in any given trial. 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
The three sentence-picture verification experiments presented here 
demonstrate, first, that information conveyed by presuppositions and 
assertions are used differently in sentence comprehension—they have 
different behavioral reflexes, as seen in Experiments 2 and 3. Further, the 
data support a view of processing sentence meaning i  which there is no 
separate process that verifies that presuppositions are atisfied in the context. 
By virtue of being backgrounded or ‘noncontroversial’ material, 
presuppositions are taken for granted unless some contextually salient piece 
of information indicates otherwise. A consequence is that ‘presupposition 
failure’ arises only as a byproduct of verifying the assertive content of a 
sentence (as in Experiments 2 and 3), or if the presupposed material is 
otherwise made extra salient (e.g. visually, or dueto recency of mention in 
the discourse, as in Experiment 1). In addition, Experiment 3 illustrates that 
the complexity of sentence verification procedures is modulated by a 
comprehender’s expectations, based on previous trial , of what should and 
shouldn’t be a possible stimulus item (e.g. in the current experiments: 
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pictures with girls and boys holding different types of items are possible; 
pictures with cats and birds, or pictures involving color, are not possible). 
More generally, the results reported here suggest that the actual procedure 
involved in verifying or falsifying a sentence in some context is never 
determined solely by the sentence’s lexical content or syntactic structure—
sentence-external things like factors influencing discourse saliency, and 
(possibly changing) expectations based on experience with respect to some 
context, affect verification procedures by changing aspects of mental 
discourse representations. 
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